. I also perform a parallel aggregate analysis of the continental U.S.
In less extreme cases than Puerto Rico, Spanish can be a dominant language, like in Miami and Los Angeles, or prevalent if not dominant, like in Chicago and San Francisco. I also consider whether the density of Spanish speakers affects how substitutable Spanish speaking immigrants are for
natives. Under what conditions can a separate Spanish-speaking labor market develop? A key hypothesis from theory is that it requires not just a large number Spanish speakers overall, but a sufficiently rich distribution of skills among Spanish speakers. This, for example, distinguishes
Miami --where majority of both highly educated and less educated workers speak Spanish --from Chicago, where Spanish speakers are disproportionately less educated.
Nearly all of the results are consistent with the view that language skills are an important source of imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives. The estimates imply that the increase in the labor supplied by immigrants (relative to natives) since 1990 in the average metropolitan area is associated with about a 6 percent decline in the hourly wage of immigrants with poor English language skills, but only a 2 percent decline in the wages of immigrants with strong English language skills (each relative to natives with similar education and work experience). I also find that the wages of immigrants who arrived as young children and long ago are less sensitive to immigrant relative supply than those who arrived and older ages and recently. Also consistent with language driving imperfect substitutability, in Puerto Rico immigration is not associated with a decline in the wages of Puerto Rican immigrants relative to Puerto Rico-born workers.
Within the U.S., several pieces of evidence suggest that Spanish-speaking immigrants behave as if they have their own labor market in markets where they are numerous. First, the wage premium 4 for speaking English, for Spanish speakers, is small in markets with a heavy Spanish-speaking presence. Second, an influx of less-educated Spanish speakers pushes down the wages of lesseducated Spanish-speaking immigrants more than other less-educated immigrants. Finally, immigration of educated Spanish-speakers appears to mitigate the impact of immigration on lesseducated Spanish speakers wages. Despite a heavy Cuban presence in Miami, for example, the relative wage of less-educated Miami Cubans is about the same as less educated Spanish-speaking immigrants elsewhere. The heavy presence of educated Cubans in Miami contributes to this, according to the estimates. Put differently, Spanish and non-Spanish speakers wages respond most strongly to skill ratios in their own language group.
The findings refine our understanding of the forces which affect immigrant poverty. Previous research already suggested that the wage impacts of immigration were borne disproportionately by immigrants themselves, and these results says that they are borne particularly strongly by immigrants with poor English language skills, who are among the poorest immigrants (in recent U.S. data, 29 percent of immigrants who do not speak English were in poverty, compared to 15 percent of immigrants overall), and by Spanish-speaking immigrants. The estimates here are consistent with the increase in immigration since 1990 contributing an additional one to two percentage points to the poverty rate of less-educated low-English immigrants, and an additional two to four percentage points to the poverty rates of less-educated Spanish-speaking immigrants.
However, immigrant poverty rates actually fell over this period, so this result only says that immigrant poverty rates would have fallen more quickly without additional immigration. 2 5 I.
Motivation and Background
It is useful to begin with some basic facts about immigrants and natives language skills and wages.
Panel A of Table 1 shows average English skills for immigrants and natives. It was constructed by combining data from the 2007, 2008 and 2009 American Community Surveys (Ruggles et al., 2010) for the working-age residents of 136 high immigration metropolitan areas described below. 3 These metropolitan areas contain over 80 percent the immigrants living in the U.S. Table 1 also shows separate means by whether or not the respondent has any college education. Throughout the paper, those with a high school degree or less will be referred to as less educated and will be a focus of the analysis, as they make up a disproportionate share of those in poverty.
The first line of Panel A shows that only 46 percent of immigrants speak English only or very well. In contrast, among the native-born, this number is over 98 percent (lower half of table). To a useful first approximation, U.S. natives are fluent in English, whereas only half of immigrants are.
The latter rises to 68 percent if you include immigrants who say they speak English well (but not very well ). By this broader measure of English proficiency, about half of immigrants without college are proficient in English, and 90 percent of immigrants with college education are proficient in English (columns 2 and 3).
Spanish speakers will also be a focus of this study, and Panel B shows the English skills of just those immigrants and natives who report speaking Spanish at home. The analysis below also exploits variation in English skills by immigrants age at arrival and time in the U.S. Figure 1a shows average language skills by these characteristics. The share who speak English well has a positive monotonic association with time in the U.S., rising from half of those who arrived in the past five years to 90 percent of those who have been in the U.S. at least 40 years (a pattern which may partly reflect cohort differences in English skills). Figure 1a also shows the sharp decline in the share of immigrants who speak English well (as adults) in age at arrival: it is higher among those who arrived before age 10 compared to those who arrived at older ages. This fact was exploited in Bleakley and Chin (2004) (BC) to study the effect of language skills on wages.
They argued that there is a critical period at young ages when children are able to easily learn English. Below, I ask if there is a similar kinked relationship in the substitutability of immigrants for natives by age at arrival. 4 Figure 1b shows that this kinked relationship is mainly present among less-educated immigrants; among more educated immigrants, the relationship is smoother. 5
Suggestive evidence that English skills are important for economic well-being is shown in The wage gap between less educated immigrants and natives is analyzed directly in multivariate regressions in Table 3 . Column (1) repeats the finding in from column (2) of Table 2 , that lesseducated natives earn about 18 percent less than less-educated natives. Column (2) of Table 3 shows that a single control variable --a dummy for speaking English only or very well --can account for most of this gap. The coefficient on this control suggests that there is a 21 percent wage premium to speaking English fluently, a finding which is consistent with previous estimates of the returns to speaking English in the U.S. labor markets (e.g, Chiswick and Miller, 1995, and Carliner, 1996) . This likely overstates the causal effect of English speaking ability, however. Column (3)
shows that the addition of simple demographic and skill controls reduces the magnitude of this coefficient. Estimates in BC s study exploiting age at arrival are, in fact, consistent with no causal effect of English language skills on wages. They could account for wage gaps across immigrants with varying English language skills entirely with education differences across these groups.
The last three columns of Appendix Table A1 for other examples) these estimates predict there will be no premium to English fluency. 7 Below, I reassess how the relative wages of Spanish-speaking immigrants is affected by the density of Spanish and English speakers in the labor market, using the estimation framework I describe now.
II. Theory and Derivation of an Estimation Equation
A starting point for a simple theory of how language skills matter in the U.S. labor market is the notion that among those with otherwise similar skills, those who cannot communicate in English well (hereafter, speak English for short) imperfectly substitute for workers who do; the former 9 might not be very effective in occupations which require a lot of communication, for example (Peri and Sparber, 2009 ). For simplicity, imagine workers can be sharply divided into those who can and cannot speak English, indexed with j=1 and j=0, respectively. If these two types are imperfectly substitutable, the wage premium to being able to speak English will decline in the relative number of workers who speak English and who do not, which I capture with the following relationship:
(1)
Lj is the number of workers and wj is the wage of language type j workers, and a and b are positive constants. b measures the degree of imperfect substitutability: it will be zero if those who can and cannot speak English are perfect substitutes. 8 In principle, (1) could be estimated using variation across labor markets and over time in the relative number of workers who speak English only, very well or well as a proxy for L1 and the remaining workers as a proxy for L0. In order to be consistent with prior estimates of the impact of immigration on wages, however, it is useful to translate (1) into something which directly involves immigrants and natives. 9 To do so, first recall that nearly all natives report speaking English fluently. The relative number of non-English speakers is driven almost entirely by immigration, and, in practice (demonstrated below) moves almost one-for-one (in percent terms) with the relative number of immigrants.
, where L F and L N are, respectively, the number of foreign-born and native-born workers. Imposing this linear approximation on (1), we have that:
To translate the left hand side into the wages of immigrants and natives, first note that since all natives are assumed to speak English we can impose w N = w1. (In practice, below, natives who report imperfect English will be dropped from the wage sample.) As for immigrants wages, the analysis will explore variation across groups of immigrant with varying English ability. In particular, I will look across the ten year age-at-arrival and five year years in U.S. categories shown in Figure 1 (in addition to directly across the English language skill categories shown in Tables 1 and 2 ). So suppose g indexes these different categories of immigrants, and fraction jg of group g speaks English. I can write the mean log wage of group g immigrants as lnw Fg = jglnw1 + (1-jg)lnw0 + eg, where eg represents sources of immigrant-native wage gaps other than English skills (for example, ethnic discrimination or legal status.) Translating this into a immigrant-native wage gap: 
The intercept, ag, is a combination of constants. (2) implies that among otherwise similar immigrants and natives, the sensitivity of the relative wages of foreign workers to changes in foreign relative supply is diminishing in the share of foreign workers with good language skills. For example, immigrants who arrive as children tend to have better English skills than those who arrive as adults, and so (2) implies that the wages of those who arrive as children should respond less to immigrant inflows than immigrants who arrive as adults.
This simple model leaves out several things. First, according to the model, immigrants with perfect English, jg = 1, are perfect substitutes for natives; their relative wages are insensitive to immigrant relative supply. An important simplification used to derive (2) was that other sources of immigrantnative wage gaps (eg) are unrelated to immigrant relative supply. If this is not the case, then even fluent immigrants relative wages may be sensitive to the number of immigrants relative to natives.
This may also bias estimate of (2), an issue which will be discussed further below. Second, this model assumes that English skills are equally important for all jobs --the b in (1) is a constant. 10 As it is plausible English skills are more important in high-skill jobs, the estimates below allow the effects to vary by the education level of the worker.
Finally, this simple model can also only partly accommodate the fact that in some parts of the U.S., Spanish, not English, is the dominant language. In Puerto Rico, where both immigrants and natives speak Spanish, (2) applies and implies immigrants relative wages should not respond to the relative number of immigrants. In markets with a mix of Spanish-speaking and English-speaking workers, it is not clear what will happen, but some theories are suggestive. According to Lang s (1986) theory of language discrimination, wages are lower for Spanish-speaking (or generally, nonEnglish speaking) immigrant laborers than natives because they bear the cost of training a bilingual supervisor; however, where Spanish is spoken by a majority of workers (as it is in some U.S. markets), the sign of wage gap with natives reverses. In Peri and Sparber (2009) , less-educated immigrants are segregated into manual occupations because of their inferior (English) communication skills. Though they did not discuss it in the paper, one might imagine that with a large enough density of fellow Spanish speakers, it might be possible for Spanish speakers to have 12 access to a full range of occupations. 11 In both theories, having enough skilled (Lang s supervisors ) or educated Spanish speakers would be important for a separate Spanish labor market to emerge, which is supported by preliminary evidence in Table 3 . This will be evaluated below by adding terms to (2) measuring the size of the Spanish-speaking labor pool by education.
III. Estimation and Identification
The main estimates of (2) will use variation across skill groups and metropolitan areas in the relative aggregate hours worked of the immigrant population, as follows:
where i indexes two education groups (high school or less, more than college) and c indexes metropolitan areas, and H represents the aggregate hours of the specified group. bg is the estimate of -(1-jg)b in (2) which is expected to be negative and to be smaller in magnitude for immigrants with stronger English-language skills. (3) will be estimated both jointly and separately by education group.
All estimates of (3) include time-varying education group controls, agit, which, like the slope, will be allowed to vary across immigrant groups, g. These controls capture economy-wide changes in the wage structure. The dependent variable will be computed as the difference in the mean log wages of immigrants in group g and natives with the same education, i, in the same metropolitan area, c, and year, t, or cell ict for short. 12 To reduce the influence of compositional differences between immigrants and natives on this estimated mean wage gap, natives mean wages will be computed 11 In particular, one might assume the output of Peri and Sparber s production function made with Spanish-speaking workers was perfectly substitutable for the output made with English-speaking workers. 13 using weights that give them, on average, the same education and experience as the immigrants in group g in cell ict. 13 (In practice, the raw wage gap produces similar results.) (3) will be estimated by ordinary least squares (that is, unweighted) and standard errors will be computed to be robust to arbitrary error correlation across observations on the same metropolitan area.
The error term in (3) captures other determinants of immigrants relative wages. There are two broad reasons to expect that this error term will be correlated with immigrants relative hours, which will lead estimates of bg to be biased. Areas with a high relative demand for some immigrant subgroup would tend to simultaneously have high relative wages and hours for the workers in this group, thereby generating a positive correlation between the error term and the explanatory variable and leading to slope estimates less negative. 14 A standard way to address this is to use predictable variation in the size of immigrant inflows based on the labor markets in which immigrants from different parts of the world tend to cluster (Mexicans in LA, Russians in New York, etc.) This approach is described in the Appendix. In practice, it tends to produce similar results to the ordinary least squares estimates that are presented below, suggesting that this type of bias may not be large. In addition, in section IV.C., I will present estimates of (2) that rely only on aggregate variation --that is, across education x experience groups, similar to OP --rather than variation across labor markets. This also produces similar, if less precise, estimates.
(3) is also likely to be biased because immigrants with poor English language skills tend to be dissimilar from U.S. natives in other ways which affect their substitutability with natives. For example, the largest group of immigrants with poor language English language skills are Mexicans, 13 In particular, those with high school or less are divided into high school completers and high school dropouts, and those with some college or more will be divided into those with and without four year degrees. Within these cells, workers are further divided into five-year potential experience bands up to 40. The mean of native log wages are computed weighted by p/(1-p), where p is the fraction of each detailed education x experience x metropolitan area x year cell that are group g immigrants, among group g immigrants and natives in that cell. (This weight is interacted with the ACS or Census sample weight.) Cells with no natives or no group g immigrants are dropped. 14 These estimates are also well-identified only if the geographic units involved act as closed economies. U.S. evidence suggests that local labor markets behave like closed economies in the sense that immigrants do not appear to displace native-born workers with the same skills (e.g., Card and DiNardo, 2000) nor do they have much impact on industry mix (Lewis, 2004 ).
14 many of whom reside in the U.S. illegally. Their legal status may confine Mexicans to particular occupations, making it harder for them to compete head to head with natives. In the absence of a perfect way to identify immigrants who differ only in their language skills and not other factors (legal status in particular is not measured), the approach I take is to examine variation across different immigrant subgroups, such as by age at arrival. While variation across these different subgroups is likely to suffer from some of the same problems as variation across English skill categories measured directly, the hope is that the combination of evidence presents a consistent picture. Overall, the direction of bias is unclear, though in light of the evidence that relative demand is not leading to much bias in the estimates, the approach taken in this paper may be biased towards finding that language accounts for imperfect substitutability.
III.B. Data
Data for the regression analysis come from the 2000 Census of Population and 2007 Population and , 2008 Population and , and 2009 Community Surveys. The latter three (which are from Ruggles et al., 2010) are combined into what will be referred to as 2008 data. Information on hours worked and hourly wages were aggregated to the metropolitan area by year by broad education group, as described above.
Included in the calculation of workers hours were workers age 16 to 65, with positive potential experience (old enough to be out of school given a normal progression through school), living in one of the 136 metropolitan areas in the sample. 15 The wage sample is the subsample of these workers who are currently employed with positive wage and salary earnings and zero farm or 15 Also, those living in group quarters were excluded from the analysis.
15 business earnings in the past year. 16 Metropolitan areas were defined consistently using PUMAs and 1990 metropolitan area boundaries. Table 4 presents the (unweighted) means and standard deviations of these data. The relative log hours of immigrants in the average area is negative both overall and by education level, which says immigrants are on average a minority of workers; in the mean education-metro-year observation immigrants hours represent about 14.4 percent (=e -1.934 x100) of natives hours. There is a lot of variation across these metro areas in the relative hours of immigrants: the standard deviation is around 1, which will be useful for interpreting the magnitude of the regression estimates below.
The table also shows the immigrant-native wage gap is around 12.5 percent in the average metropolitan area, and is much larger for low-English immigrants, even the ones matched to natives with similar education and experience (as these gaps are calculated to do). There is a lot of variation in the immigrant -native wage gap across metro areas to be explained, which I will now try to do. Table 5 presents estimates of (3). Panel A examines the relative wages of all immigrants. The -0.04 estimate in column (1) says that a one unit increase in immigrants relative hours is associated with a 4 percent decline in the wages of immigrants relative to natives. Although a one unit increase in the independent variable means approximately tripling immigrants labor supply, which sounds like a lot, it is actually a reasonable change to examine as it is both a standard deviation (Table 4) 16 and roughly equal to the increase in this variable since 1990 in the average metropolitan area. 17 In any case, the -0.04 response is similar in magnitude to previous estimates of this relationship, such as OP or Card (2009) .
IV. Results

IV.A. Basic U.S. Evidence
Panel B of Table 5 produces separate estimates for the wages of immigrants who report strong
English language skills --immigrants who say they speak English only, very well, or well --and who report poor English language skills --immigrants who say they speak English not well or not at all. As expected, the relative wages of immigrants with poor English are more negatively associated the relative presence of immigrant labor: their wages decline 5.7 percent for a one unit increase in the independent variable, compared to 2.2 percent decline for immigrants with stronger English. The difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the one percent level, shown as the p-value less than 0.01 in the row beneath these estimates.
Columns (2) and (3) show estimates separately by broad education. Panel A indicates that educated immigrants wages are more responsive than less educated immigrants , despite the fact that educated immigrants tend to report substantially better English language skills (Table 1 ). This may not be inconsistent with the importance of English, however; it is plausible that language skills are more important in jobs that require college education, a view for which there is some evidence (Berman, Lang, and Siviner, 2003) . In addition, the difference in the wage responses of immigrants with poor and strong English are similar for more-and less-educated immigrants: in Panel B the gap in coefficients is 3.6 (=0.047-0.011) percentage points for less-and 3.3 (=0.078-0.045)
percentage points for more-educated immigrants.
Panel C breaks out estimates by the more detailed English language skills shown in Tables 1 and 2 . Figure 2a examines how the wage response varies by age at arrival and time in the U.S. It plots coefficient estimates (and confidence intervals) from estimates of (3) --that is, still using the same variation in immigrant relative labor by broad education, metropolitan area, and year --separately for immigrants in the ten year age-at-arrival categories and five year years in U.S. categories shown on the figure s x-axis. Panel A shows that the response of wages by age-at-arrival follow the same kinked pattern that self-reported English language skills did in Figure 1a . While it is possible that other unobserved factors that affect immigrants substitutability with natives follow this kinked pattern, this reinforces the direct evidence from English language skills in Table 5 . On top of this, the kinked relationship in the response appears to be limited to the less-educated subsample where it was found (Figures 1b and 2b) . There is also a monotonic relationship with time in the U.S.
( Figure 2a, panel B) .
IV.B. The Effects of Language Supply
All of the regressions presented so far have employed the same independent variable: the natural log of the ratio of immigrants aggregate hours to natives aggregate hours. In this section I instead employ direct measures of the supplies of language skills, including as the natural log of the aggregate hours of those who speak English not well or not at all (those with poor English ) to those who speak English only, very well, or well (those with strong English ). In addition, to try and understand what happens in markets with a large numbers of Spanish speakers, I will add controls for the relative hours of workers who speak Spanish at home.
The results are in Table 6 . To keep things simple, the table examines only workers with a high school education or less. Column (1) repeats the estimate from Panel A of Table 5 : it says the overall immigrant -native log wage gap declines 3.4 percent for a 1 unit increase in immigrants relative hours. Column (2) replaces this independent variable with the one measuring the relative hours of those with poor English relative to strong English. The coefficient is the same to two decimal places. This supports the argument made in Section II that, as a practical matter, the relative supply of English language skills moves one-for-one with the relative supply of immigrants.
Column (3) repeats the estimates of column (2) for the subgroup of immigrants who report speaking Spanish at home. The estimated wage response is nearly identical for this subgroup. To investigate if the responses vary with the density of Spanish speakers in the market, column (4) adds controls for the aggregate hours of workers who speak Spanish at home relative to workers with strong English. This measure is entered separately for college and non-college workers, following the results in Table 3 . Column (4) presents weak evidence that there is an additional depressing effect of having a large number of Spanish speaking non-college workers on the wages of non-college Spanish speakers, in addition to the impact having a large number of non-English speakers. However, this is offset by the positive wage impact of greater density of college-educated Spanish speaking immigrants.
A graphical version of the column (4) relationship is shown in Figure 3 . It plots Spanish-speaking relative hours among workers with more than a high school education versus those with a high school education or less the two variables in the lower half of (Card and Lewis, 2007) . Over the past 20 years, the wage advantage of these new areas for Mexicans has completely eroded because the Spanish inflows have been disproportionately less-skilled. 20
18 Specifically, it is a line with a slope of 0.7 = 0.045/0.065 the ratio of the two lower coefficients in column 4 that goes through the sample median of the two variables, which are shown with the dotted lines in the figure. The residual scatter plot, conditioning out poor/strong English, is shown in Appendix Figure A1 and has the same qualitative patterns. 19 What I refer to as new immigrant destinations in the Singer (2004) typography include her three categories of emerging, re-emerging, and pre-emerging. The predicted values are computed using all three variables in column (4) . Another major factor in the wage determination of less educated workers is the ratio of college to non-college workers in a labor market (e.g., Card, 2009) Table 6 imply that Mexicans would have earned 3.5 percent more in new than in traditional destinations in 1990, but by 2008 they would have earned one percent less.
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The estimates in Table 6 might additionally be interpreted as indicating that a sufficiently rich skill distribution of Spanish speakers allows a Spanish-speaking labor market to emerge within an area. To provide additional evidence for this, column (5) shows an estimate of the same relationship for non-Spanish speaking immigrants who, in this view, should not be affected by the density of Spanish speakers. The wage boost from college educated Spanish speakers is not present for them. Also in column (5) there is a positive coefficient on the less-educated Spanish/English hours ratio which nearly offsets the coefficient on poor English/English hours, indicating that an inflow of less-educated Spanish speakers has little overall effect on the wages of non-Spanish speaking immigrants. Put differently, Spanish and non-Spanish speakers wages respond most strongly to skill ratios in their own language group. This is consistent with Spanish speakers having their own labor market.
IV.C. Puerto Rico
The U.S. contains one labor market, not examined in the previous analysis, in which nearly all immigrants and natives speak Spanish: Puerto Rico. 21 According to the view that language skills drive imperfect substitutability with natives, Puerto Rican immigrants should be perfect substitutes for Puerto Rican natives: their relative wages should not respond to immigrants relative labor supply. The approach of examining a market where immigrants and natives share a language was previously taken by Castillo, Gilless and Raphael (2009) (CGR), who examined Costa Rica.
Since Puerto Rico is a single labor market, the analysis cannot exploit geographic variation in the size of the immigrant population. Instead, I follow the approach of CGR and OP and use variation over time and across education-experience cells, to be detailed below, in the size relative size of the immigrant workforce.
That Puerto Rico has a non-trivial amount of immigration is perhaps surprising. Figure 4 The analysis will exploit variation across the cells in Figure 4 , and, within these, across years of potential experience, grouped into five year cells up to 40. Usual weekly hours worked is not available in the 1970 Census, so hourly wages and aggregate hours worked will be replaced with weekly wages and weeks worked. In particular, the estimation equation is: (4) control for an exhaustive set of education x experience, experience x year, and education x year dummies. 22 22 All estimates of (4) are unweighted, with standard errors computed to be robust to arbitrary error correlation within education x experience cells. In the Puerto Rican data, weeks worked is computed for those aged 16-65 who are not living in group quarters and who are old enough to be out of school. The Puerto Rican wage sample consists of those in the weeks sample with positive wage earnings, zero business and farm earnings, who are not currently enrolled in school and who report an occupation.
For comparison, (4) will also be estimated using data on the continental U.S., which will also serve as an additional check on the cross-city results presented above. 23 Results are presented in Table 7 , with Panel A for Puerto Rico and Panel B for the Continental U.S.
Column (4) shows a negative and marginally significant coefficient of -0.033, for the U.S., which is surprisingly similar to the estimates in Table 5 given the large difference in methodology. The estimate for Puerto Rico is not zero, but positive and significant. A likely explanation for this that changes in the weeks worked partly reflects labor demand, which moves weeks worked and weekly wages in the same direction. To address this, I exploit the fact that much of the variation in the relative size of the immigrant workforce in Puerto Rico is driven by changes in the raw numbers of U.S.-born ethnic Puerto Ricans and Puerto Rican-born. As these reflect education and fertility decisions made long in the past, they are unlikely to be systematically related to present demand. 24 The size of these two populations is computed using the combination of Puerto Rican and U.S. data, which is necessary because one third of the Puerto Rican born population lives in the U.S. When relative weeks worked is replaced by the relative population size, in column (2), the coefficient is indeed nonpositive and is close to zero. Column (3) shows that this variable moves almost exactly one-for-one with the weeks worked variable, a relationship that is highly significant. 25 The relationship in column (2) The remaining columns of Table 7 examine separately the relative wage response (in the continental U.S.) of immigrants with poor and strong English, measured in the same way as in Panel B of Table 5 . 26 This measure is not available until 1980, and so column (5) show estimates excluding 1970, which are smaller in magnitude and less precise. Broken out separately by English skills, in columns (6) and (7), the negative response is limited to immigrants with poor English.
Though these estimates are not precise, they are similar in magnitude to the difference in response between high-and low-English immigrants that was found in Table 5 , around 3 percentage points.
V. Implications for Poverty
What can we say about the effects of immigration on poverty in light of these estimates? A full answer to this question requires estimates of the effect of immigration on a broader set of wage outcomes than were studied in this chapter, but are explored in other research Smolensky, 2008, 2009) . To simplify, the main thing the present estimates omit is the effect immigration has on wages by shifting the ratio of non-college to college labor. However, Card (2009) shows this is small (because the ratio is similar for immigrant and native workers). On top of these previously estimated effects, the estimates in this chapter imply that immigration has a larger impact on the wages of immigrants with poor English language skills, already a high poverty group (Table 2) , and depending on immigrants mix of language skills, on Spanish-speakers.
Furthermore, the wage responses of these groups can be roughly translated into an effect on poverty rates, assuming all immigrants wages are shifted down by the amount implied by the 26 These columns exclude native-born workers who do not report speaking English only or very well.
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estimates. The estimates in both Table 7 and Table 5 are consistent with a one unit increase in the relative supply of immigrant labor --again, roughly equal to the increase since 1990 --lowering the wages of immigrant workers with poor English by 3 percentage points more than immigrants with strong English. The resulting three percent decline in wages, assuming all immigrants income is from wages (which is close to true) would, without changing hours worked, be expected to drop the low-English immigrants between 100 and 103 percent of the poverty line into poverty. In 2008, this represented about one percent of low-English less-educated immigrants. If you also consider the fact that the decline in wages might induce some immigrants to work less, a reasonable approximation is to double this estimate. 27 In short, the rise in immigration since 1990 might have added one to two percentage points to the poverty rate of immigrants with poor English (compared to immigrants with strong English). Using the estimates in column (4) 
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VI. Conclusions
On balance, the estimates in this paper suggest that while immigrants imperfect English language skills may not be the only reason that they are imperfect substitutes for native-born workers in the U.S., they are a major reason for this. Using several different approaches and samples I have found that the wages of immigrants with poor English language skills tend to respond more negatively to a greater presence of immigrants than do the wages of immigrants with strong English language skills. A bottom line is that, at least among less-educated immigrants, immigration since 1990 
B. United States
Note: Scales of the two graphs are (roughly) proportional. Labels identify education x five year experiences cells. The x-variable in Panel A is the residual ln(ethnic Puerto Rican US-born/Puerto Rican-born population). (A one unit increase in this variable is associated with a one unit increase in the relative weeks worked of non-Puerto-Rican born workers --see Table 7 ). All variables are residuals from a regression on an exhaustive set of education x year, experience x year, and education x experience dummies. Raw data sources are U.S. and Puerto Rican Population Censuses, and American and Puerto Rican Community Surveys (Ruggles et al., 2010) . See text for details. (Ruggles et al. 2010) . Sample limited to working-age population (age 16-65 with positive years of potential work experience) residing in 136 large metropolitan areas and not in group quarters. Panel B is further restricted to those who report speaking Spanish at home. Sample weights used to construct shares. (Ruggles et al. 2010) . In Panel B, sample is limited to workingage population (age 16 -65 and old enough to be out of school, given normal progression) residing in 136 large metropolitan areas and not in group quarters. In Panel A, sample is limited to respondents from the Panel B sample that are currently employed and that had positive hours worked, positive wage and salary earnings, and zero self-employment and farm earnings in the past year. Wages are adjusted to 1999 dollars using the consumer price index, and wages exceeding 200 dollars and less than 2 dollars in 1999 dollars are replaced with these thresholds.
Foreign-Born
Native Born (Ruggles et al., 2010) . Sample limited to working-age respondents (age 16 -65 with positive years of potential work experience) that have 12 or fewer years of education, that reside one of 136 large metropolitan areas and not in group quarters, that are currently employed, and that had positive hours worked, positive wage and salary earnings, and zero self-employment and farm earnings in the past year. Wages exceeding 200 dollars or less than 2 dollars in 1999 dollars are replaced with these thresholds. Standard errors, in parentheses, computed to be robust to arbitrary error correlation within metropolitan area. *Other controls are a quartic in potential work experience; years of education; years of interacted with education below 9 years, born after 1950, and both; and dummies for education less than 9 years, born after 1950, female, black, Hispanic, female*black, and female*hispanic. Popula tion. Sa mple for cons tructing hours worked includes a l l those a ged 16-65 who a re old enough to be out of s chool (given norma l progres s ion) a nd res i ding i n one of the 136 metropoli ta n a rea s i n the sa mpl e a nd not in group quarters . To be i n the wa ge s ampl e requi res bei ng in the hours worked sa mpl e plus bei ng employed, wi th pos itive weeks a nd hours worked l a s t yea r, nonzero wa ge a nd s al a ry ea rni ngs, a nd zero bus ines s a nd fa rm ea rni ngs; for na tives it a ls o requires spea king Engli s h "onl y" or "very well ." Hourly wa ges a bove $200 a nd bel ow $2 i n 1999 doll a rs a re res et to thes e threshol ds. Da ta ha ve been a ggrega ted to 136 metropol ita n a rea s x two educa tion groups x two years (2000 a nd "2008," combining the three ACSs ). Ta ble shows unwei ghted mea ns a nd s ta nda rd devia tions . (Ruggles et al., 2010) and 2000 Census of Population. Table shows coefficient estimates from regressions of the wage gap between specified immigrants and "similar" natives (see below) on the natural log of the ratio of aggregate hours worked of immigrants and natives, using variation across metropolitan areas, year (2000 or "2008") and the two broad education of columns (2) and (3). All regressions control for year by education effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, computed to be robust to arbitrary error correlation within metropolitan area. Sample for constructing mean wages limited to working-age respondents (age 16 -65 and old enough to be out of school given normal progression) , that reside one of 136 large metropolitan areas (112 in Panel C) and not in group quarters, that are currently employed, and that had positive hours and weeks worked, positive wage and salary earnings, and zero business and farm earnings in the past year; for natives, sample is further limited to those who report speaking English "only" or "very well." Hourly wages above $200 and below $2 in 1999 dollars were reset to these thresholds. *The mean ln hourly wage of "similar" natives is computed by weighting natives to have the same distribution across potential experience (in five year bands) x education (four groups: high school dropouts, high school, some college, and at least four years college) cells as the specified group of immigrants in the metropolitan area and year. (Ruggles et al., 2010) and 2000 Census of Population. Wage sample limited to working-age respondents (age 16 -65 with and old enough to be out of school, given normal progression) that have 12 or fewer years of education (or a GED), that reside one of 136 large metropolitan areas and not in group quarters, that are currently employed, and that had positive hours worked, positive wage and salary earnings, and zero self-employment earnings in the past year; for natives it also requires speaking English "only" or "very well." The dependent variable is the difference in the mean ln hourly wage between the specified group of immigrants and similar natives, where the mean ln hourly wage of "similar" natives is computed by weighting natives to have the same distribution across potential experience (in five year bands) x education (high school dropouts or completers) cells as the specified group of immigrants in the metropolitan area and year. Strong English-speaking hours worked is the sum of hours worked by those who report speaking English "Only" "Very Well," or "Well," while poor English-speaking hours are the sum of hours worked reported by those who speak English "Not Well" or "Not at All" among working-age respondents. "Spanish-speakers" are respondents who report speaking Spanish at home. All regressions are unweighted and control for year effects. Standard errors, in parentheses, computed to be robust to arbitrary error correlation within metropolitan area.
All Spanish-Speaking ln(Immigrant Wage/Native Wage), High School or Less : 1970, 1980, 1990, a (2010) . Sa mple for independent varia bl e includes workers a ge 16-65 who a re ol d enough to be out of school gi ven norma l progres si on through school a nd not l iving i n group qua rters . The s ampl e us ed to compute the dependent va ri a ble, weekl y wa ges , is this s a mpl e with the a ddi ti onal requi rement of being currently empl oyed (U.S.) or reporti ng an occupa tion (Puerto Rico), not enrol led in s chool , a nd wi thout busi ness or fa rm income. In U.S. da ta (columns 4-7), weekl y wa ges exceedi ng $10,000 or bel ow $10 in 1999 doll ars were res et a t these thres holds . In col umns 5-7, na tive-born workers who did no report s pea king Engli s h "onl y" or "very well " were excl uded from the wa ge s a mpl e. Sa mpl e wei ghts used to a ggrega te va ri a bles to the 5-yea r experience x educa ti on cel ls us ed i n the a na l ys is (s ee text). Sta nda rd errors a re cal cul a ted to be robus t to a rbitra ry error correla tion wi thi n educa tion x experience cel ls .
weekly wage)
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Appendix A
To address the possibility that a high presence of immigrants in a market reflects high wages in those markets --which would tend to bias the coefficients in Tables 5 and 6 Table A2 , along with
The numerator is thus the predicted number of immigrant arrivals in cell jc. This is converted to a predicted arrival rate by dividing by the area s beginning of decade population, Pc,t-1. The assumption behind this instrument is immigrants persist in locating in certain areas because they value being near similar immigrants, and not because these areas have persistently stronger wage growth for that type of immigrant.
This instrument is a strong predictor of immigrants relative hours. F-statistics on the instrument in the first stage are in the 50-100 range. In addition, instrumental variables estimates using this instrument are similar to the OLS estimates presented in Table 5 . This is shown in Appendix Table   A3 , which is identical in structure to Table 5 Points are residuals of a regression of ln(Spanish/English hours) on ln(poor/strong English hours), separately by education (high school or less on the x-axis, more than HS on the y-axis). Points above sloped line have above average wages for Spanish-speaking immigrants, relative to natives, (conditional on ln(poor/strong English hours) according to estimates in Table 6 (Ruggles et al., 2010) and 2000 Census of Population. Table shows coefficient estimates from regressions of the wage gap between specified immigrants and "similar" natives (see below) on the natural log of the ratio of aggregate hours worked of immigrants and natives, using variation across metropolitan areas, year (2000 or "2008") and the two broad education of columns (2) and (3). All regressions control for year by education effects and are estimated by instrumental variables using the lagged origin mix instrument described in the appendix. Standard errors, in parentheses, computed to be robust to arbitrary error correlation within metropolitan area. Sample for constructing mean wages limited to working-age respondents (age 16 -65 and old enough to be out of school given normal progression), that reside one of 136 large metropolitan areas (112 in Panel C) and not living in group quarters, that are currently employed, and that had positive hours and weeks worked, positive wage and salary earnings, and zero business and farm earnings in the past year; for natives, sample is further limited to those who report speaking English "only" or "very well." Hourly wages above $200 and below $2 in 1999 dollars were reset to these thresholds. *The mean ln hourly wage of "similar" natives is computed by weighting natives to have the same distribution across potential experience (in five year bands) x education (four groups: high school dropouts, high school, some college, and at least four years college) cells as the specified group of immigrants in the metropolitan area and year.
